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Obesity Liability: A Super-Sized Problem or a
Small Fry in the Inevitable Development of
Product Liability?
Samuel J. Romero∗
ìIt would be safer if they told their children, ëGo out and play in
traffic.íî1

I.

INTRODUCTION

For most of us, food is the ultimate temptation. It has been
since Biblical times, when Adam and Eve succumbed to the
temptation of a forbidden fruit. According to Christian tradition,
man remains personally responsible for Adamís act of eating
forbidden fruit with the knowledge that it was forbidden.2 In the
past few years, several federal and state courts have been asked
to adjudicate who should be held responsibleófast-food
restaurants or their consumersófor the health problems that
result from restaurantsí success in tempting consumers to eat
their products.3 The fast-food restaurants insist they should not
be held responsible when their customers choose to consume
these food products knowing the products could contribute to
obesity.4 Nevertheless, some consumer advocates believe that
∗

Juris Doctorate Candidate, Chapman University School of Law, May 2004. This article
was made possible by the patient and insightful critique of Professor Melissa Berry. I
also want to thank Amy Duncan, Brock Zimmon, Christian Spaulding, Rick Faulkner,
and the Chapman Law Review members and staff for their insightful editing and
assistance. Finally, I would like to thank my parents Joel and Sarah Romero for their
many prayers, immeasurable support, and Christian guidance.
1 Irvin Molotsky, Risk Seen in Saturated Fats Used in Fast Foods, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
15, 1985, at A20 (quoting Dr. Tazewell Banks, director of a heart program at D.C. General
Hospital, on the subject of parents who allow their children to eat foods rich in
unsaturated fats at fast-food restaurants).
2 Romans 5:12-21.
3 See, e.g., Pelman v. McDonaldís Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Nathan K. Bierma, Food Industry Cooks up Ways to Stymie Suits, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 15,
2003, ß 5, at 1 (discussing the food industryís response to seven obesity suits); Geraldine
Sealey, Whopper of a Lawsuit: Fast-Food Chains Blamed for Obesity, Illnesses (describing
a lawsuit brought by a 270-pound man against McDonaldís and three other fast-food
restaurant chains), http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/fatsuit020725.html (July
26, 2002).
4 Press Release, National Restaurant Association, National Restaurant Association
Supports Prevention of Abusive Lawsuits Against Food Industry (Jan. 28, 2003) (ìExperts
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these restaurants should be held responsible for the negative
health effects these products create, especially when the negative
effects impact children.5
Plaintiffs suing the fast-food industry for causing consumer
obesity have been unsuccessful in the courts.6 For example, on
January 22, 2003, a New York federal district court dismissed
ìobesityî claims against McDonaldís by the guardians of two
obese children, stating:
[L]egal consequences should not attach to the consumption of
hamburgers and other fast-food fare unless consumers are
unaware of the dangers of eating such food . . . . If consumers
know (or reasonably should know) the potential ill health
effects of eating at McDonalds, they cannot blame McDonalds
if they, nonetheless, choose to satiate their appetite with a
surfeit of supersized McDonalds products.7

The court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend.8 Nine
months later, after the plaintiffs had amended their complaint,
the court determined that there was again insufficient evidence
to resist McDonaldís motion to dismiss.9 The district courtís final
dismissal without leave to amend constituted the first
substantive defeat of the nascent campaign against the fast-food
industryís promotion of obesity.
Obesity is a costly reality of American life.10 In 2001, the
Surgeon General described obesity as having ìreached epidemic
agree that all food can be part of a healthy diet and maintaining a healthy lifestyle is
more about balancing energy in and energy out, not chastising some of Americaís favorite
foods. Restaurants should not and will not be blamed for issues of personal responsibility
and freedom of choice.î), http://www.restaurant.org/pressroom/print/index.cfm?ID=549.
5 Bierma, supra note 3. San Francisco attorney Stephen Joseph, who sued Kraft
successfully for failing to disclose the danger of trans fats in Oreos, discussed the
potential for litigation involving child plaintiffs. Mr. Joseph stated, ìëShould adults be
suing because of obesity? No. In cases regarding children? There are certainly good
arguments of liability in some situations.íî Id. Even 2004 Democratic Presidential
candidate Senator Joe Lieberman has supported the idea that children should be
protected from the marketing practices of the fast-food companies. Ira Teinowitz,
Lieberman on Attack Against Fast-Food Ads, ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 8, 2003, at 4.
6 Bierma, supra note 3. ì[N]one of the estimated seven obesity lawsuits nationwide
has gained a major victory for plaintiffs . . . .î Id. On the other hand, success is not
always measured by wins and losses in the court. Consumer advocates also claim success
if they can point to changed behavior in the food industry. See id. (positing that the
threat of litigation may change behavior).
7 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 517-18, 543.
8 Id. at 543.
9 Pelman v. McDonaldís Corp., No. 02 Civ. 7821, 2003 WL 22052778, at *14-15
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003).
10 See Marion Nestle & Michael F. Jacobson, Halting the Obesity Epidemic: A Public
Health Policy Approach, 115 PUB. HEALTH REP. 12 (2000) (discussing the effects of obesity
and arguing for increased attention to preventative measures); Anne M. Wolf, The Health
Economics of Obesity and Weight Loss, in EATING DISORDERS AND OBESITY: A
COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK 453 (Christopher G. Fairburn & Kelly D. Brownell eds., 2d
ed. 2002) (comparing the economic impact of obesity to that of smoking).
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proportions in the United States.î11 He associated 300,000
deaths a year to obesity and warned that if ì[l]eft unabated, . . .
obesity may soon cause as much preventable disease and death
as cigarette smoking.î12 In 2004, his estimates were validated by
a study published in the Journal of the American Medical
Association on the causes of death in the year 2000. The study
found that 400,000 deaths were attributable to obesity and
The study also
435,000 were attributable to smoking.13
estimated that, absent a sudden reversal in the overweight trend,
obesity will soon overtake tobacco as the leading cause of death
in the United States.14 Death, however, is not the only cost of
obesity. The Surgeon General estimated direct and indirect costs
of obesity at approximately $117 billion a year.15 Thus, most
experts agree that the expenses and consequences linked to
obesity are significant.
Therefore, the crux of the current debate on obesity is how to
assign responsibility for the great harm it causes. Consumer
advocates argue that individuals should not be assigned
responsibility when their outside environment may be the
determining factor that caused their obesity.16 The argument is
set out by Yale psychology professor Dr. Kelly Brownell, who
boldly asserted that ì[i]n the absence of a ëtoxicí food and physical
activity environment, there would be virtually no obesity.î17 Dr.
Brownell claims that genetic predisposition to obesity is not the
cause of obesity. ì[I]t is clear that genetics may permit obesity to
occur but a ëtoxicí environment causes it to occur.î18 Dr. Brownell
cites a report as authoritative from the Institute of Medicine
which concludes:

11 David Satcher, Foreword to OFF. OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEPíT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVS., THE SURGEON GENERALíS CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND
DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY 2001, at XIII (2001). But see Jerome P. Kassirer &
Marcia Angell, Losing WeightóAn Ill-Fated New Yearís Resolution, 338 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 52, 52 (1998) (arguing that the estimate of 300,000 deaths per year in the United

States caused by obesity is not well established and that it may be ìcalled into question by
methodologic difficultiesî).
12 Satcher, supra note 11, at XIII.
13 Ali H. Mokdad et al., Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 2000, 291
JAMA 1238, 1238-40 (2004).
14 Id. at 1242.
15 OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEPíT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE
SURGEON GENERALíS CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND
OBESITY 2001, at 10 (2001).
16 For example, Ralph Nader likened cheeseburgers to weapons of mass destruction.
David Wallis, Questions for Ralph Nader: Give Them the Business, N.Y. TIMES, June 16,
2002, ß 6 (Magazine), at 13.
17 Kelly D. Brownell, The Environment and Obesity, in EATING DISORDERS AND
OBESITY: A COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK 433, 433 (Christopher G. Fairburn & Kelly D.
Brownell eds., 2d ed. 2002).
18 Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
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Although it is clear that genetics has a modest influence on
obesity on a population basis, by far the largest amount of
variance in body weight is due to environmental
influences . . . . The root of the problem, therefore, must lie in
the powerful social and cultural forces that promote an energyrich diet and a sedentary lifestyle.19

Ultimately, Dr. Brownell identifies two aspects of the American
ìtoxicî environment that cause obesity. First, he faults the food
industry for promoting over-consumption of inexpensive,
unhealthful food.20 Second, he cites American environmental
factors that cause declining physical activity.21 The former cause
is the issue that has recently been litigated in the courts.
The criticism of the American food industryís contribution to
an environment that promotes obesity is multifaceted.
Nutritional experts have criticized the industry for influencing
dietary and nutritional guidelines.22 Powerful lobbies have
resisted efforts to clarify nutritional messages sent to the public
that encourage them to limit sugars and fatty foods.23 The food
industry has ìuse[d] every means at their disposalólegal,
regulatory, and societalóto create and protect an environment
that is conducive to selling their products in a competitive
marketplace.î24 This influence has resulted in an environment in
which food advertising disproportionately promotes unhealthful
products.25 Finally, the food industry has aggressively marketed
fast-food products to children, the most vulnerable segment of
society.26
19 Id.; COMM. TO DEVELOP CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THE OUTCOMES OF
APPROACHES TO PREVENT & TREAT OBESITY, INST. OF MED., WEIGHING THE OPTIONS:
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING WEIGHT-MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 53, 152 (Paul R. Thomas
ed., 1995).
20 Brownell, supra note 17, at 434, 436.
21 Id. at 436-37.
22 E.g., MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES
NUTRITION AND HEALTH 67-92 (2002).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 93.
25 See Brownell, supra note 17, at 434.
The yearly marketing budget of McDonaldís is $1.1 billion, and of Coca-Cola,
$866 million, and these are just two companies. The budget of the National
Cancer Institute to promote healthy eating is $1 million. Advertising for
healthy [sic] foods versus that for fast foods, soft drinks, and so on, is a drop
against a tidal wave. It is not a fair contest, and the outcome, a world with
diets growing rapidly worse, cannot be considered surprising.
Id.
26 Id. at 436; NESTLE, supra note 22, at 173-218. The fast-food industry has overtly
targeted children. Justice Clarence Thomas took notice of this tactic as recently as three
years ago by noting that the fast-food inudstry targeted children openly with success.
Although the growth of obesity over the last few decades has had many causes,
a significant factor has been the increased availability of large quantities of
high-calorie, high-fat foods. . . . Such foods, of course, have been aggressively
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For the past few years, legal commentators have suggested
that the many similarities between the tobacco and the fast-food
industry would eventually expose the fast-food industry to
liability.27 They have identified several product liability theories
that could be available to hold the fast-food industry responsible
for causing obesity.28 Meanwhile, in 2003 and 2004, Congress
debated whether the fast-food industry should be protected from
liability and proposed bills limiting the food industryís liability
One of these bills, the Personal
for causing obesity.29
Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, has passed the House
and awaits action by the Senate.30 So, the question remains, can
obesity lawsuits be successful, and, if so, should the fast-food
industry be protected from liability? Given the billsí current
status in Congress, the question of liability remains viable, but
the potential causes of action are undetermined.
This comment explores the doctrinal basis for product
liability for food that causes obesity. Part II provides a brief
history of product liability.
Part III discusses the recent
litigation with McDonaldís. Part IV explores the causes of action
that may be brought against the fast-food industry and the
individual potential for success of each. It also considers the
barriers consumer advocates must overcome to hold the fast-food
industry liable for causing obesity using any of these causes of
action. Part V discusses the potential public policy implications
of a law like that proposed by the Personal Responsibility in Food
Consumption Act. Finally, this comment concludes that the food
industry should not be exempted from liability by further
Congressional action.
An exemption will not benefit the
industry, while the threat of liability benefits both the industry
(by maintaining an environment with sufficient flexibility for the
success of the fast-food industry) and society (by providing the
impetus to fashion a remedy for this serious health problem).

marketed and promoted by fast food companies. . . . Moreover, there is
considerable evidence that they have been successful in changing childrenís
eating behavior.
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 587-88 (2001)(Thomas, J. concurring).
27 John Alan Cohan, Obesity, Public Policy, and Tort Claims Against Fast-Food
Companies, 12 WIDENER L.J. 103, 110-16 (2003); Franklin E. Crawford, Fit for Its
Ordinary Purpose? Tobacco, Fast Food, and the Implied Warranty of Merchantability, 63
OHIO ST. L.J. 1165, 1217-23 (2002).
28 See Cohan, supra note 27, at 126-28; Crawford, supra note 27, at 1223.
29 Commonsense Consumption Act of 2003, S. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003); Personal
Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 339, 108th Cong. (2003); Small Business
Liability Reform Act of 2003, H.R. 2813, 108th Cong. (2003).
30 The Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act was passed on March 10,
2003 by a vote of 276 to 139. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 54, http://clerk.
house.gov/evs/2004/roll054.xml (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRODUCT LIABILITY
Product liability law is of relatively recent origin. One
hundred years ago, consumers suing to recover damages caused
by a defective product could recover only if they could prove the
manufacturer was negligent and that they were in privity (i.e.,
they had personally purchased the product). In the landmark
case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., then Judge Benjamin
Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals revolutionized product
liability by substantially abolishing the privity rule when danger
was foreseeable.31 MacPherson established that privity was not
determinative of liability when there was negligence. According
to Judge Cardozo, ìIf [the manufacturer] is negligent, where
danger is to be foreseen, a liability will follow.î32 In addition,
Judge Cardozo expanded product liability beyond the limitations
imposed by contracts and based it on public policy.33
Over the next forty years, courts further dissolved the
contract limitations placed on product liability. No longer relying
on express warranties, the courts allowed non-privity plaintiffs to
recover on implied warranty claims. In the case of Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., the court held manufacturers strictly
liable under an ìimplied warranty that [the product] is
reasonably suitable for use as such accompanies it into the hands
of the ultimate purchaser.î34 Under this theory, consumers were
protected from defective products that did not meet their
expectations.
Subsequently, many courts began interpreting product
liability in terms of strict liability in tort rather than in the
contract theory of implied warranty.35 Dean William L. Prosser
had a significant role in effecting this change by drafting section
31 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916). MacPherson involved a lawsuit against Buick
for negligence in purchasing defective wheels which caused the plaintiffís accident. The
plaintiff was not in privity because he purchased his Buick from a dealer rather than from
a manufacturer. Id.; CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA:
DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE COMMON LAW 173-84 (2001) (giving a
brief but insightful description of the MacPherson case).
32 MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
33 Id. ìWe have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb . . .
grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation where it
ought to be. We have put its source in the law.î Id. See also BOGUS, supra note 31, at
184.
34 161 A.2d 69, 84 (N.J. 1960). Henningsen involves the sale of a new Plymouth
sedan that was driven for less than 500 miles before it inexplicably veered into a wall
after an apparent failure of the steering mechanism. Although the contract contained
warranty disclaimers and clauses indicating that the contract was the entire agreement,
the court found the defendant liable under an implied warranty theory rather than
negligence because the car had been so badly damaged that it was impossible to
determine if the manufacturer had been negligent. Id. at 73-75, 84.
35 BOGUS, supra note 31, at 185.
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402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.36 Section 402A stated
in part: ìOne who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused . . . .î37 In essence, section 402A abolished privity and
made manufacturers liable for physical injuries caused by their
defective products regardless of fault.38 Courts rationalized this
change by emphasizing three theoriesómanufacturers could be
held liable because they were enterprises that could: spread costs
of liability, be encouraged to make safer products, and be held
responsible because they had represented their products as
safe.39
As section 402A became accepted, courts assigned
manufacturer liability for three types of defects: ì(1)
manufacturing defects or production flaws, (2) design defects,
and (3) information or warning defects.î40 The first type of
defect, manufacturing, is the result of ìflaws or irregularities in
products arising from errors in production.î41 The seller is
subject to liability if the ìproductís condition is dangerous in a
manner not intended by the seller nor expected by the
consumer.î42 An example of a manufacturing defect is the
Bridgestone/Firestone tire failures on Ford Explorers that
ìprobably resulted in part from various irregularities in the
production process.î43 The second type of defect, design, ìoccurs
when the intended design of the product line itself is inadequate
and needlessly dangerous.î44 The seller is liable for products
with design defects because there is ìan unreasonably dangerous
aspect or feature of the product.î45 The quintessential example of
a design flaw is Fordís infamous exploding Pintos with

36 Id. at 186. ìThis Restatement section was to be cited in more than three thousand
court opinions and, in one fashion or another, to become accepted by every American
jurisdiction.î Id. at 185.
37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ß 402A (1965).
38 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS ß 353, at 974-75 (2000).
39 Id. at 975-76.
40 Id. ß 354, at 979.
41 David G. Owen, Manufacturing Defects, 53 S.C. L. REV. 851, 852 (2002).
42 Id. at 893.
43 Id. at 852-53 & n.6. See also In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012,
1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that a tire products liability action was not manageable as a
nationwide class action); In re Bridgeston/Firestone, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1156
(S.D. Ind. 2002) (refusing to dismiss a product liability suit on forum non conveniens
grounds brough by victims of vehicular accidents in Venezuela and Columbia). See
generally Public Citizen and Safetyforum.com, Spinning Their Wheels: How Ford and
Firestone Fail to Justify the Limited Tire Recall (providing background information on the
dispute), http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF266.pdf (last visited May 29, 2004).
44 DOBBS, supra note 38, ß 355, at 980.
45 Bogus, supra note 31, at 193.
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unprotected rear gas tanks.46 Liability is extended to protect
society from the harmful effects of the unsafe features of these
products. Finally, warning defects occur when products become
unreasonably dangerous because ìno information explains their
use or warns of their dangers.î47 Liability is extended to
manufacturers because these products could be reasonably safe if
For
accompanied by adequate information or warnings.48
example, a company may not manufacture full strength glucose
in a bottle without a warning to parents to dilute the product
because it is dangerous to babies without dilution.49
In 1998, the American Law Institute promulgated the
Products Liabilities section of the Restatement (Third) of Torts,
which clearly defined these three types of defects.50 In addition,
it rejected the use of a ìconsumer expectationî test as the
standard for determining design defectiveness except in cases
involving food products.51 Instead, the risk-utility test was
adopted,52 which requires courts to ìattempt to balance the risks
of the product as designed against the costs of making the
product safer.î53 When applying this test, courts often refer to
the following seven factors listed by Dean John Wade:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product . . . . (2) The
safety aspects of the product ñ the likelihood that it will cause
injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury. (3) The
availability of a substitute product . . . . (4) The manufacturerís
ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product . . . . (5)
The userís ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care . . . .
(6) The userís anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in
the product and their avoidability . . . . (7) The feasibility, on
the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss . . . .54

Because these factors so closely resemble negligence, product
liability for design defects is often considered to be equivalent to
liability for negligence.55

46

1981).

Id. at 190-93; Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App.

DOBBS, supra note 38, ß 355, at 981.
Id.
Id.; Ross Labs. v. Thies, 725 P.2d 1076 (Alaska 1986).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. ß 2.
Id. ß 2 cmt. g. ìWith regard to two special product categories [food products and
used products] consumer expectations play a special role in determining product defect.î
Id. ß 2 cmt. h.
52 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. ß 2 cmt. a.
53 DOBBS, supra note 38, ß 357, at 985.
54 John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.
REV. 825, 837 (1973).
55 DOBBS, supra note 38, ß 357, at 986-87.
47
48
49
50
51
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Finally, one commentator argues that we are now reaching a
new level of product liability called generic liability or product
category liability.56 Generic product liability results ì[w]hen a
product remains unreasonably dangerous despite the best
possible design, construction, and warnings.î57 Because the
product ìgenerically fail[s] a risk-utility test,î the manufacturer
is made liable because the productís risks outweigh its benefits.58
The commentator asserts that liability imposed on gun and
tobacco manufacturers falls under this concept.59
This brief history demonstrates the breadth of perspectives
that must be brought to a discussion of product liability for fast
food. As noted above, product liability involves elements of
contract, intentional torts, negligence, strict tort liability, and
public policy. The following analysis of fast-food litigation
explores the McDonaldís litigation within this context and then
extends that analysis to future cases.
III. MCDONALDíS LITIGATION
In August 2002, McDonaldís Corporation was sued in the
Supreme Court of New York, Bronx County, by the parents of
two overweight children.60 The parents claimed their children
were ìconsumers who [had] purchased and consumed
[McDonaldís] products and, as a result thereof, [had] become
overweight and [had] developed diabetes, coronary heart
disease, . . . and/or other detrimental and adverse health effects
as a result of the [McDonaldís] conduct and business practices.î61
McDonaldís removed the action to federal court and then filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.62
A.

First Motion to Dismiss Complaint

The individual counts against McDonaldís were a mixture of
both intentional and negligent torts. The first two counts were
for intentionally violating the New York Consumer Protection
Act (New York Gen. Bus. Law sections 349 and 350) among other
statutes.63
Count one alleged that McDonaldís misled its
customers in marketing campaigns by representing their
products as nutritious and by not disclosing both their

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

BOGUS, supra note 31, at 193-96.
Id. at 195.
Id.
Id. at 195-96.
Pelman v. McDonaldís Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d. 512, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 520.
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ingredients (products high in cholesterol, fat, salt and sugar) and
the detrimental effects of these ingredients.64 Count two alleged
that McDonaldís also used these same deceptive marketing
techniques to target children.65 The third and fifth counts were
based on negligence. Count three alleged negligence for selling
products causing obesity, and count five alleged McDonaldís
negligently marketed addictive food products.66 Finally, count
four was based on an allegation that McDonaldís failed to warn of
the addictive properties of its foods.67
As to the first two counts, McDonaldís argued that, because
the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (ìNLEAî)
exempts the restaurant industry from federal labeling
requirements, McDonaldís could not be held liable under New
York state law for their failure to provide nutritional
information.68 Under the NLEA, most packaged foods must be
labeled with nutritional information.69
Thus, most food
manufacturing industries are protected against claims that a
food product caused their obesity because consumers had an
explicit warning of the content of the food they ate. Restaurants,
on the other hand, are specifically exempt from such labeling
requirements.70 Therefore, McDonaldís argument runs, federal
Id.
Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 520.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 525-26. See also 21 U.S.C. ß 343(q) (2003).
21 U.S.C. ß 343(q)(1).
21 U.S.C. ß 343(q)(5)(A)(i). The pre-exemption statute, 21 U.S.C. 343-1(a)(4),
requires that the states not interfere directly or indirectly with the federal laws and
regulations dealing with nutritional labeling of packaged food. Yet, the statute also
allows the states to establish whatever nutritional labeling requirements they wish for
those foods exempt under the act; in our case, restaurant food. The preemption section
also applies to nutrient and health claims made by restaurants. Any cause of action
based on a nutrient or health claim should have been preempted. According to the Code
of Federal Regulations:
[t]he following foods are exempt from this section . . . (2) Food products which
are: (i) served in restaurants, Provided, That the food bears no nutrition
claims or other nutrition information in any context on the label or in labeling
or advertising. Claims or other nutrition subject the food to the provisions of
this section.
Nutrition Labeling of Food, 21 C.F.R. ß 101.9(j) (2003). The court later addresses a
potential claim that customers could maintain a well-balanced diet eating at McDonaldís
everyday. If interpreted as a health claim, this claim should have been preempted. The
courtís citation to the Federal Register indicating states were allowed to regulate ìunder
their own consumer protection laws . . . menus [from] provid[ing] false or misleading
informationî was true but slightly misleading. Pelman, at 526 (citing Food Labeling;
General Requirements for Health Claims for Food, 58 Fed. Reg. 2478, 2517 (Jan. 6,
1993)). Just three years after the courtís citation, the court would have found a clearer
exposition of the preemptive provisions in the Federal Register.
The provision on nutrition labeling . . . includes an exemption for foods that are
served or sold in restaurants . . . (section 403(q)(5)(A)(i)). This exemption,
however, is contingent on there being no claims or other nutrition information
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

ROMERO FINAL - JUNE 1

249

6/1/2004 1:14 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 7:239

law preempts any state law regulating the labeling of food
products. The court did not agree. The NLEA permits states to
impose labeling requirements for certain food industries that are
exempt under the act, including the restaurant industry. 71 In
fact, the Food and Drug Administration has interpreted the
NLEA as permitting the states to enact laws protecting
consumers from menus with ìfalse or misleading information.î72
Consequently, the court held that the federal labeling laws did
not protect McDonaldís from plaintiffsí New York state law
claims.73
The court, therefore, addressed the first two counts of
misleading advertisements by following the interpretive
requirements for New York statutes.74 The New York Consumer
Protection Act75 requires the plaintiff plead with specificity any
ìdeceptive acts or practices that form the basis of a claim.î76 The
court cited as examples of deceptive acts or practices public
statements made by the tobacco industry in which they denied:
that there is a causal link between disease and tobacco, that
cigarettes are addictive, and that they manipulated nicotine to
regulate cigarette addictiveness.77 Ultimately, the plaintiffs were
not successful because they did not provide equivalent examples
of such practices by McDonaldís. Their complaint did not identify
one single deceptive act toward consumers or their children.78
The complaint also failed to show that McDonaldís decision not to
post its nutritional information was a deceptive omission.79
Accordingly, these plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence of
deception to the court.80
The
court
then
considered
whether
additional
advertisements and McDonaldís statements on their website
were deceptive.81 These advertisements either encouraged the
on the label or labeling, or in the advertising, for the food. The use of nutrient
content claims, health claims, or other nutrition information on the label or
labeling of a food sold in a restaurant or other establishment in which food is
served for immediate consumption will subject that food to the nutrition
labeling provisions of the act (see sections 403(q) and (r) of the act and
ß101.9(j)(2)(i) through (j)(2)(iii) (21 CFR 101.9 (j)(2)(i) through (j)(2)(iii))).
Food Labeling; Nutrient Content Claims and Health Claims; Restaurant Foods, 62 Fed.
Reg. 40320 (1996).
71 21 U.S.C. ß 343-1(a)(4).
72 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW ßß 349-50 (2004).
76 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
77 Id. at 526-27.
78 Id. at 527, 530.
79 Id. at 529.
80 Id. at 527, 530.
81 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 527-28.
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public to eat at McDonaldís every day or asked the public to
make McDonaldís meals part of a balanced diet.82 Although
claims based on these statements could have survived the motion
to dismiss for lack of specificity, the court noted that the
statements were likely not deceptive.83 According to the court, a
reasonable consumer would not have been misled by McDonaldís
conduct.84 Furthermore, the statements were not made in
conjunction, so McDonaldís never asserted that eating their
products every day would constitute a well-balanced diet.85 The
court contrasts this practice with that of Subway, which has
made some implied health claims.86 McDonaldís advertisements
ìencouraging consumers to eat its products ëeverydayí is mere
puffery . . . in the absence of a claim that to do so will result in a
specific effect on health.î87 As a result, the court concluded that
these statements were not misleading.88
Conversely, the court did characterize some older
McDonaldís advertising as deceptive.89 This, however, was not
helpful to the plaintiffs because the court was careful to note that
these advertisements would likely be barred by statutes of
limitations.90 For instance, one advertisement claimed that
ìsodium is down across the menu,î when it was not.91 Another
advertisement did not disclose the presence of preservatives
when it discussed the ingredients in its shakes.
The
advertisement finished by saying ìthatís all,î implying there were
no additional ingredients.92 Each of these ads is deceptive on its
face. Nonetheless, the court considered them only to assist the
Id. at 527.
Id.
See id. at 525, 528.
Id. at 527-28.
Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 528 n.15 (describing Subwayís advertising campaign
claiming that its product is a ìhealthier alternative to fatty fast foodî and highlighting the
dietary accomplishments of Jared Fogle, who lost 235 pounds on a diet of two daily meals
at Subway for a year and has been featured in Subway commercials). Yet Subwayís press
releases do not specifically endorse Jaredís diet nor do they explicitly claim that a Subway
diet is a healthy diet. For example, one press release indicated that ìSubway Corporate
Dietician Lanette Roulier stresses that the chain does not endorse the ëJared Dietí.î Press
Release, Subway, (December 2000), http://www.subway.com/Publishing/PubRelations/
PressRelease/pr-011101j.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2004). Furthermore, Subwayís website
contains a disclaimer that Jaredís weight loss program included exercise and that his
results are not typical. Subway website, Jaredís Statistics, http://subway.com/subway
root/MenuNutrition/Jared/jaredStats.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2004) (ìIndividuals lost
weight by exercising and eating a balanced, reduced-calorie diet that included SUBWAYÆ
sandwiches with 6 grams of fat or less. Their results are not typical.î).
87 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
82
83
84
85
86
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plaintiffs in shaping any future claim.93
The court emphasized that McDonaldís could only be held
liable for failing to post nutritional labeling on its products if that
omission was deceptive.94 According to the court, businesses do
not have a duty to inform each individual customer of
information relevant to that consumerís use of the product unless
the business alone possesses ìmaterial information.î95 The
plaintiffs had never alleged that nutritional content ìwas solely
within McDonaldsí [sic] possession or that a consumer could not
reasonably obtain such information.î96 Absent a claim that
McDonaldís held nutritional information the public could not
access, McDonaldís failure to post nutritional information was
not deceptive.97
B.

Common Law Claims

In count three, the plaintiffs claimed that McDonaldís
negligently manufactured and sold products causing obesity and
failed to warn its consumers of the inherent danger of their
products. The court dismissed the claim holding that the
plaintiffs had neither established a duty of the defendants nor
shown that the defendantís actions were the proximate cause of
their childrenís obesity.98
The court first addressed plaintiffsí failure to show a duty.
The plaintiffs alleged that McDonaldís products were inherently
dangerous as formulated, with ìhigh levels of cholesterol, fat, salt
and sugar,î and that McDonaldís, therefore, had a duty to warn
its consumers of these dangers.99
McDonaldís counteredó
framing the issue as one of misuse through over-consumption
rather than inherent dangeróclaiming that it had no duty to
protect consumers from dangers caused by the over-consumption
of its food when the public is well aware of such dangers.100
McDonaldís based its claims on a comment to section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts:
Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all
consumption, and any food or drug necessarily involves some
risk of harm, if only from over-consumption. Ordinary sugar is
a deadly poison to diabetics, and castor oil found use under
Mussolini as an instrument of torture. That is not what is
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Id. at 528.
Id. at 529.
Id.
Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
See id.
Id. at 530-40.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 531-32.
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meant by ìunreasonably dangerousî in this Section. The
article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the
community as to its characteristics. . . . Good tobacco is not
unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking
may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like
marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous. Good butter is not
unreasonably dangerous merely because, if such be the case, it
deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks;
but bad butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is
unreasonably dangerous.101

The court agreed with McDonaldís over-consumption analysis
and concluded that any product liability ìbased on overconsumption is doomed if the consequences of such overconsumption are common knowledge.î102 On the other hand, he
noted that tobacco was also mentioned in the comment as a
product with well-known dangers and this did not bar tobacco
liability because tobacco companies had intentionally altered
nicotine levels to induce addiction.103 Thus, McDonaldís could be
liable only if its products were ìso extraordinarily unhealthy that
they are outside the reasonable contemplation of the consuming
public or that the products are so extraordinarily unhealthy as to
be dangerous in their intended use.î104 The plaintiffsí claims
could not pass this bar.
The court then turned to the question of proximate cause.
The court reasoned that based on the complaint, a jury would be
required to engage in ìwild speculationî to find that McDonaldís
caused the obesity.105 The complaint did not specify how often
the child plaintiffs ate at McDonaldís.106 McDonaldís products
would cause the plaintiffsí obesity only if the plaintiffs ate at
McDonaldís frequently enough to establish a ìsignificant role in
the plaintiffsí health problems.î107 In addition, the complaint
included articles that identified other factors that contributed to
plaintiffsí obesity.108 To successfully prove proximate cause, the
plaintiffs would have to address or eliminate these factors.109
Since the plaintiffs did not address these deficiencies, the court
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ß 402A cmt. i (1965).
Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 532.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 538.
Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d. at 538. However, in a footnote the court noted that the
plaintiffs later attached affidavits stating how often the plaintiffs ate at McDonaldís. Id.
at 538 n.28.
107 Id. at 538-39.
108 Id. at 539.
109 Id.
101
102
103
104
105
106
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held proximate cause was a barrier that prevented negligence
liability.110
According to the court, its decision to dismiss the claims
based on negligence was consistent with some basic policy
principles. Primarily, ìit is not the place of the law to protect
[the consumers] from their own excesses.î111 Furthermore, it is
not the courtís role to interfere when the ìconsumer exercises free
choice with appropriate knowledgeî as long as the manufacturer
does not intentionally ìmask[] . . . information necessary to make
the choice.î112
The court also addressed four additional common law
arguments raised outside the complaint to assess whether the
plaintiffs could make an adequate argument for duty in an
amended complaint, and identified two that could have
potential.113 First, the plaintiffs had argued that McDonaldís
processed their products to the point that they were more
dangerous than what a reasonable consumer could expect from
an unprocessed product.114 This argument had potential because
any additional danger would be latent rather than patent unless
the public was also aware of the danger of this additional
processing.115 Second, a modified argument based on McDonaldís
knowledge of consumersí potential misuse could have merit.116
The modified argument would have merit if McDonaldís should
have been aware that its consumers intended to eat at
McDonaldís ìfor every meal of every dayî and if McDonaldís was
also aware that this frequency of consumption was unreasonably
dangerous.117 On the other hand, a claim based on overconsumption rather than exclusive consumption at McDonaldís
would likely fail due to the courtís prior analysis.
Counts four and five were based on McDonaldís failure to
warn its consumers. Count four alleged that McDonaldís failed
to warn of the unhealthy attributes of its products and failed on
the same principles as count three. To prove McDonaldís failed
to warn, the plaintiffs had to prove the defendant had a duty to
warn. However, the plaintiffs neglected to establish such a duty

Id. at 539-40.
Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 533.
Id.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 534-35. ìFor instance, Chicken McNuggets, rather than being merely
chicken fried in a pan, are a McFrankenstein creation of various elements not utilized by
the home cook.î Id. at 535.
115 Id. at 534.
116 Id. at 537.
117 Id.
110
111
112
113
114
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in the complaint.118 The court cited a number of factors involved
in assessing whether there was a duty to warn including: the
ìfeasibility and difficulty of issuing a warning . . . ;î the
ìobviousness of the risk from actual use of the product;î the
ìknowledge of the . . . user; and proximate cause.î119 The court
also recognized that proximate cause would be precluded if a
danger was obvious.120 Therefore, the court dismissed this count
because the complaint failed to allege ìMcDonaldís products . . .
were dangerous in any way other than that which was open and
obvious to a reasonable consumer.î121
Finally, the court addressed count five, which alleged that
McDonaldís failed to warn of the addictive properties of its
products. The court noted that the complaint did not specify that
the plaintiffs themselves were addicted nor did it explain how
McDonaldís products were involved in causing this addiction.122
As it stood, the complaint was ìoverly vague.î123 The court
dismissed this count for its failure to allege the ìaddictive nature
of McDonaldís foodsî and its failure to allege that their food was
the proximate cause of the plaintiffsí obesity.124
In summary, the plaintiffsí initial complaint was dismissed
for lack of specificity. In the first counts, the plaintiffsí failed to
allege specific acts of deception toward consumers or toward child
plaintiffs. In the subsequent claims, the plaintiffs were unable to
specify why the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiffs to not
make products that were dangerous if over-consumed, or why the
defendant owed a duty to warn of obvious dangers.
The decision in this case was guided by the principle that
McDonaldís should be held liable only if its ìproducts involve a
danger that is not within the common knowledge of
However, the court also recognized that
consumers.î125
government has a responsibility to protect individuals ìin those
situations where individuals are somehow unable to protect
themselves and where society needs to provide a buffer between
the individual and some other entityówhether herself, another
individual or a behemoth corporation that spans the globe.î126
Ultimately, the court determined that these principles ìrequire
the complaint to be dismissed for lack of specificity,î with leave to
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

Id. at 540-41.
Pelman, 237 F. Supp 2d. at 540.
Id.
Id. at 541.
Id. at 542.
Id.
Pelman, 237 F. Supp 2d. at 542-43.
Id. at 518.
Id. at 516.
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amend,127 which was essentially a public policy decision based on
personal responsibility.
C.

Amended Complaint

After the first complaint was dismissed, the plaintiffs re-filed
an amended complaint with claims dealing exclusively with the
New York Consumer Protection Act.128 The three counts were
constructed to conform to the dicta in the prior dismissal. For
example, count one alleged that the plaintiffs were misled into
believing McDonaldís products ìwere nutritious . . . and/or easily
part of a healthy lifestyle if consumed on a daily basis.î129 Count
two alleged that McDonaldís failed to disclose that their foods
were substantially less healthy than they appeared because of
additives and further processing.130 Count three alleged that
McDonaldís claimed that it provided nutritional information
adequately, which in reality it did not.131 Ultimately, this
amended complaint was likewise dismissed because the
plaintiffsí allegations still did not demonstrate that the
defendantís actions or deception caused them injury.132
Unfortunately, much of the plaintiffsí case for deception
rested on old advertisements; thus, the claims were barred by the
statute of limitations.133 The plaintiffs attempted to argue a
variety of theories to toll the statute of limitations, including the
ìcontinuing practice exception,î134 the ìseparate accrual rule,î135
the ìdiligence-discovery accrual rule,î136 and infancy tolling.137
However, the court discarded the first three of these theories,
leaving only infancy tolling.138 This presented its own difficulty
Id. at 519.
Pelman v. McDonaldís Corp., No. 02 Civ. 7821, 2003 WL 22052778, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 3, 2003).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at *14.
133 Pelman, 2003 WL 22052778, at *4-6.
134 The continuing practice exception requires a tolling after ìeach successive
deceptive statement in furtherance of [an] overall scheme.î Id. at *5.
135 The separate accrual rule creates a limitation period every time ìa plaintiff
discovers, or should have discovered a new injury caused by the . . . violations.î Id.
(citation omitted).
136 Under the diligence-discovery accrual rule, ìaccrual may be postponed until the
plaintiff has or with reasonable diligence should have discovered the critical facts of both
his injury and its cause.î Id. at *5 (citation omitted).
137 Id. at *6. Under infancy tolling, a cause of action is tolled while a person is ìunder
a disability because of infancy.î Id. (citation omitted).
138 Pelman, 2003 WL 22052778, at *5-6.
The court discarded the first of these
theories as disfavored; found the second theory did not apply because no new injuries
were alleged which did not result from the initial injury; and found the third theory did
not apply because the facts about McDonaldís products were ìwell knownî such that the
plaintiffs should have known the ìcritical facts of their injury.î Id.
127
128
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since the court refused to consider advertisements observed only
by the parents, allowing only those actually seen by the
children.139
This led to the second difficulty faced by the plaintiffs.
Because the child plaintiffs had not seen many of the
advertisements, they could not prove they relied on the
advertisements.140 As a result, the plaintiffs failed to ìallege in
general terms that plaintiffs were aware of the false
advertisement, and that they relied to their detriment on the
advertisement.î141 The only ìdeceptive actî of which the infant
plaintiffs were even aware was McDonaldís statement that they
were switching to 100% vegetable oil to fry their potatoes and
hash browns and that these products would contain zero
After an analysis of this
milligrams of cholesterol.142
advertisement, the court found the complaint sufficient to allege
reliance on this alleged misrepresentation.143
The court then addressed causation, the more difficult
obstacle to the plaintiffsí case. Although the plaintiffs did not
need to prove proximate cause as they would in a negligence
case, they did have to prove that the deceptive act caused their
injuries.144 Although the plaintiffs had, ìalbeit just barely,î
established a causal connection between the ìdeceptive actsî and
the decision to eat at McDonaldís, the court held that they did not
establish an ìadequate causal connection between their
consumption of McDonaldís food and their alleged injuries.î145
Unfortunately, yet again, the plaintiffs had failed to eliminate
other factors that could have caused their obesity.146 For
example, they did not address such questions as, ìWhat else did
the [minors] eat? How much did they exercise? Is there a family
history of the diseases?î147 Therefore, the court concluded that
there was insufficient information to determine whether
McDonaldís alleged deception caused the plaintiffsí injuries or if
it was only a contributing factor.148
In the final analysis, from the courtís opening statement
focusing on plaintiffsí knowledge, it was clear that Pelman would
be decided in McDonaldís favor. Ultimately, the plaintiffsí case
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Id. at *6.
Id. at *8.
Id.
Id. at *9.
Pelman, 2003 WL 22052778, at *9.
Id.
Id. at *11.
Id.
Id.
Pelman, 2003 WL 22052778, at *11.
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unraveled because they were unable to produce specific
incidences of recent deception and because the dangers of over
consumption were obvious. Beyond even these difficulties, they
provided no evidence that McDonaldís actions caused their
injury.
IV. THE FUTURE OF FAST-FOOD LITIGATION
Proponents of liability for the fast-food industry will not give
up so easily. Professor John Banzhaf III, one of the leading
proponents, has expressed a willingness to continue to litigate
against the fast-food industry even after Pelman.149 In June of
2003, Professor Banzhaf chided Congress for considering a bill
restricting fast-food liability.150 He boldly asserted that fast-food
companies should be found liable under ìa wide variety of
different legal theories, different pieces of evidence, many of
which you have not seen.î151 Professor Banzhaf joins others who
believe the fast-food industry will one day be held liable under a
While this may be true,
currently non-existent theory.152
traditional theories should not be abandoned yet. The next
section focuses on known theories and policy implications.
Specifically, it explores product liability causes of action
currently used to hold manufacturers liable for harm caused by
their products. It details the barriers common to most of these
theories and discusses how those barriers might be problematic
in the context of fast-food litigation. Finally, it suggests some
new theories that may be used in the future to hold the food
industry liable for its actions.
A.

Potential Causes of Action: Product Liability
Modern plaintiffs can sue under a number of product liability

149 See John F. Banzhaf III, Dismissal of McDonaldís Obesity Law Suit was Expected:
Four Wins, One Loss, and Several Legal Theories Yet to Go, at http://banzhaf.net/docs/
mcd2no.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2004). See generally John F. Banzhaf III, Using Legal
Action to Help Fight Obesity, at http://banzhaf.net/obesitylinks (last visited Mar. 8, 2004).
For example, one of the lead headlines at this website is ìFlash: McDonaldís Case
Dismissed, But Anti-Fat Lawyers Arenít Discouraged.î
150 ìWith all due respect, shame on you. If it ainít broke, donít fix it, especially until
Congress is prepared to step in and adopt comprehensive legislation and save taxpayers
some 50 billion annually in obesity costs.î Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption
Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 9 (2003), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary (statement of
Professor John Banzhaf, George Washington University School of Law).
151 Id. at 10.
152 ìAnd the public, according to recent surveys, is about willing to hold them liable.
There is liability now. Juries are about to hold them liable as they are in tobacco suits.î
Id. See also, Cohan, supra note 27, at 131 (ìThe fate of obesity litigation may rest at least
in part upon the ability of judges to fashion new tort doctrines, a phenomenon that has
progressed steadily throughout the past century.î).
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theories.153 The basis for the suit may be intentional torts,
contract, strict liability, or negligence. Intentional torts cover
product liability for misrepresentation, while the rules of contract
liability cover claims based on express or implied warranty. Tort
liability for unreasonably defective products falls under strict
liability. Negligence encompasses defects in manufacturing,
negligent marketing and selling, and failing to warn of dangers.
While the theories are similar in some aspects, each presents its
own obstacles to plaintiffs.
1. Intentional Tort: Misrepresentation
Pelman was essentially decided under a theory of
misrepresentation based on the New York Consumer Protection
Act. Misrepresentation is usually a fact-intensive inquiry and
requires that the plaintiff allege reliance upon the
misrepresentation.154 In Pelman, the plaintiffs failed to show
personal reliance, and this difficulty is likely to recur in future
fast-food litigation based on misrepresentation, given the
relatively slow onset of obesity155 and the difficulty of pinpointing
the specific advertisements that caused plaintiffs to eat
particular products. The slow onset of obesity further presents
problems with statutes of limitations. Therefore, the success of
such cases, mayóas proponents have suggestedóbe dependent
on finding a theory approved by the court that will toll the
statute of limitations.
These obstacles are significant. However, plaintiffs should
not wholly abandon the theory of misrepresentation. It is
possible in some cases to allege misrepresentation based upon
intentional omissions, although the original complaint in Pelman
shows the hazards of such an approach. In Pelman, the court
dismissed misrepresentation claims because the public had
access to the same nutritional information as McDonaldís.156 An
allegation based on failing to disclose a substance that consumers
do not expect is likely to find more success in courts. For
example, in California, fast-food companies were sued for failing
to disclose the presence of acrylamide, a substance linked to

153 See Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 731 (N.Y. 1995) (holding it was
possible to find a plaintiff liable for a breach of an implied warranty when a claim of strict
products liability was not satisfied); Hyundai Motor Co. v. Rodriguez, 995 S.W.2d 661, 668
(Tex. 1999) (holding that ì[p]laintiffs are generally entitled to obtain findings that will
support alternative theories of recoveryî in strict product liability and implied warranty
claims).
154 See Dobbs, supra note 38, ß 352, at 971.
155 Scott M. Grundy, Multifactorial Causation of Obesity: Implications for Prevention,
67 AM. J. CLIN. NUTR. 563S, 565S (1998).
156 Pelman v. McDonaldís Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d. 512, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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cancer.157 Courts recognize a distinction between obvious natural
components of food and those that the consumers would not
Yet, absent a
reasonably expect to find in their food.158
conclusive showing that fast-food companies added a ìsecretî
ingredient that causes obesity, an obesity claim based on
misrepresentation by a deceptive omission will most likely fail.
2. Contract: Express Warranty
Under the law of contracts, plaintiffs may claim that a
merchant breached an express or implied warranty.159 Liability
for a breach of warranty on the sale of goods is governed by
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.160 Claims for breach
of an express warranty would be similar to claims of
misrepresentation and would arise where the fast-food producer
made claims that the food had specific health benefits. For
example, as described in Pelman, an advertisement that
represented that patrons could lose weight or receive certain
health benefits by eating at certain restaurants every day would
be an express warranty.161 However, success under this theory is
questionable because fast-food companies rarely represent that
eating their food would not cause obesity or would provide such
benefits (and they are certainly less likely to do so after Pelman).
Furthermore, the federal government regulates health and
nutrient claims made by restaurants.162 A consumer who sues a
157 Cohan, supra note 27, at 122-23.
Acrylamide is relevant to obesity liability
because it was initially shown to be present in high levels in fast foods such as fried
potatoes. However, recent research has found acrylamide present not only in fast foods
but also in other nutritious foods. Thus, it is probably impossible at this time to avoid
acrylamide. In a meeting convened to discuss acrylamide, Deputy FDA Commissioner,
Dr. Lester Crawford noted that fast foods are not the only foods to contain acrylamide.
ìThe exposure assessment has found that many foods contribute to acrylamide exposure.
No single food accounts for the majority of acrylamide exposure for the U.S. population.î
Lester Crawford, Transcript of Proceedings Food Advisory Committee, February 24-25,
2003 Meeting Acrylamide, http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/ acrytra2.html (last visited Mar.
8, 2004). Further data for acrylamide in food can be found at either the World Health
Organization
web
site,
http://www.who.int/foodsafety
/chem/chemicals/acrylamide/en/, or its infonet on acrylamide, http://www.acrylamidefood.org/. See also Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, Pesticides, Metals, Chemical Contaminants & Natural Toxins, at
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/pestadd.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2004).
158 Owen, supra note 41, at 897-98.
159 Dobbs, supra note 38, ß 352, at 971.
160 U.C.C. ßß 2- 313,-314,-315 (2003) (providing for an express warranty, implied
warranty of merchantability, and implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose for
both merchants and consumers in particular circumstances).
161 In Pelman, the plaintiffs contended that McDonaldís encouraged its customers to
eat everyday as part of a balanced diet. Apparently, this claim did not rise to the level of
a warranty. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
162 Food and Drugs, 21 C.F.R. ß 101.10 (2003) (ìNutrition labeling in accordance with
ß 101.9 shall be provided upon request for any restaurant food or meal for which a
nutrient content claim . . . or a health claim . . . is made . . . .î). See also Food and Drugs,
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restaurant for an unsupported health or nutrient claim must
show that the restaurant did not comply with the NLEA.163
Therefore, many, if not all, express warranty claims based on
restaurant nutrient or health claims would be preempted by the
NLEA. Given these difficulties, it is unlikely that consumers
seeking to hold fast-food restaurants liable based on breach of an
express warranty would be successful unless the restaurant
failed to comply with the NLEA.
3. Contract: Implied Warranty
Fast-food companies could also be held liable for breaching
the implied warranty of merchantability.
Essentially, the
implied warranty of merchantability defined in U.C.C. section 2314 is ìthe sellerís implied promise that the goods sold in a
contract of sale will work.î164 Claims based on the breach of the
implied warranty depend heavily on a courtís interpretation of
merchantability because the U.C.C. provides only a list of
ìminimum qualities goods must possess in order to be
merchantable.î165
The recent tobacco litigation provides an instructive analogy.
In the tobacco cases, courts defined merchantability in two
manners. Some courts found cigarettes unmerchantable if
plaintiff could prove cigarettes were ìcommercially unfit or
unsuitable for smoking.î166 Other courts held that cigarettes
were unmerchantable simply because their use could result in
great personal injury.167 In American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell,
the Supreme Court of Texas went further.168 There the court
held that the product would only be unmerchantable if it
contained a health danger that was not in the common
The court held that the danger of nicotine
knowledge.169
addiction was not in the common knowledge of most consumers
in 1952 when the plaintiff began smoking.170 However, that
danger was within the knowledge of the tobacco industry and,
therefore, was sufficient to prove the unmerchantability of the
product and the subsequent liability of the industry.171
21 C.F.R. ßß 101.13-.14 (2003).
163 Food and Drugs, 21 C.F.R. ß 101.9 (j) (2003).
164 Crawford, supra note 27, at 1170.
165 Id. at 1173.
166 Id. at 1199-1200 (quoting Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 230 F.
Supp. 2d 70, 94 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
167 Id. at 1200.
168 951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1997).
169 Id. at 435. Crawford, supra note 27, at 1201.
170 951 S.W.2d at 435.
171 Id. at 429- 31 (ìAddiction is a danger apart from the direct physical dangers of
smoking because the addictive nature of cigarettes multiplies the likelihood of and
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In light of these theories of merchantability, assignment of
liability to the fast-food industry under an implied warranty
theory will only apply if: (1) courts use a definition of
merchantability that focuses only on the danger of obesity from
fast foods; (2) plaintiffs are able to show present research
showing that fast food is addictive;172 and (3) the courtís
interpretation of merchantability is broader than the sellerís
promise that the goods will function as expected by an ordinary
consumer.173 Therefore, only an interpretation of warranty that
ìmerely requires goods to fulfill the basic functional purpose for
which such goods are usedî will prevent liability from
following.174 In todayís present environment, in which regardless
of all the hype about fitness and weight loss, the nation appears
to be unwilling to effectively address the dangers of obesity,175
and with no conclusive showing that fast food is addictive, it is
highly unlikely that a suit based on an implied warranty of
merchantability will be successful.
4. Strict Liability: Strict Product Liability
Under a strict product liability theory, the fast-food industry
might be strictly liable for the harm caused by any defective
product sold. However, according to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, the plaintiffs would be successful only if the product was in
a ìdefective condition unreasonably dangerous.î176 As noted in
Pelman, comment i to section 402A of Restatement (Second) of
Torts clearly addresses and negates the argument that the
danger from over-consumption of high fat food was so
unreasonably dangerous that fast food was defective.177 The
Restatement (Third) of Torts defines food defects in terms of a
contributes to the smokerís ultimate injury, in Grinnellís case, lung cancer.î).
172 In an article discussing the implied warranty of merchantability, one author
suggests that if fast food is shown to be addictive and if the public perception of the
addictive nature of fast food changes, it will enable plaintiffs to ìanalogize their U.C.C.
section 2-314 claims to those of plaintiffs injured by cigarettes.î Crawford, supra note 27,
at 1220. Evidence of fast foodís addictive qualities is not far-fetched. First, fast food is
generally high-fat and served in larger portions. Researchers have also identified
hormonal changes that ìremove some element of free willî and have shown similarities
between drug addiction and sugar addiction. Diane Martindale, Burgers on the Brain,
NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 1, 2003, at 27-29. ìHowever, the idea that food is addictive is far
from mainstream.î Id. at 29. See also Jiali Wang et. al., Overfeeding Rapidly Induces
Leptin and Insulin Resistance, 50 DIABETES 2786 (2001); Carlo Colantuoni et. al.,
Evidence that Intermittent, Excessive Sugar Intake Causes Endogenous Opioid
Dependence, 10 OBESITY RESEARCH 478 (2002), http://www.obesityresearch.org/cgi/
content/abstract/10/6/478.
173 See Crawford, supra note 27 at 1223-24.
174 Id. at 1224.
175 This is my own opinion based on evidence that obesity and its effects are growing
rather than retreating.
176 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ß 402A (1965) (emphasis added).
177 Id. ß 402A cmt. i.
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consumer expectation test.178 Under this test, manufacturers
would not be liable for causing obesity if consumers were aware
of fast foodís dangerous qualities. In simple terms, consumers
know that if they eat too much high fat food they get fat.
Therefore, under these definitions of defectiveness, no liability
would likely follow.
On the other hand, courts could use a risk-utility test for
defectiveness. Under that test, ìcourts attempt to balance the
risks of the product as designed against the costs of making the
product safer.î179 The problem with this test is that food is
essential for life, and the risk comes largely from overconsumption. Therefore, any attempt to make food safer is
counter-productive if the food continues to be over-consumed.
The only way to skirt this argument is to claim that ìa product is
simply so dangerous that it should not have been made available
at all.î180 This difficulty was highlighted in Pelman when
plaintiffs were unable to meet the burden of proving that fast
food is ìso extraordinarily unhealthy that they are outside the
reasonable contemplation of the consuming public or that the
products are so extraordinarily unhealthy as to be dangerous in
their intended use.î181 Obviously, this is a heavy burden to
prove, and, therefore, the risk-benefit test becomes mostly a
policy choice on whether dangerous products should be sold at
all.
5. Strict Liability: Product Liability, Duty to warn
Under strict product liability in tort, the plaintiff may also
argue that the fast-food industry has a duty to warn of the
unhealthy attributes of their products. But as noted in Pelman,
the duty to warn depends on a variety of factors such as: the
feasibility and difficulty of issuing a warning, the obviousness of
a risk, the knowledge of the users, and proximate cause.182
Again, although a warning may be both feasible and easy to
issue, the risk from eating fast foods is obvious and in the
common knowledge of most consumers relieving the producer of
the duty to warn. On the other hand, a plaintiff may complain
that portions are super-sized at fast-food restaurants, thus the
danger of over-consumption is concealed. The difficulty with this
argument is that portion size is also obvious and within the
common knowledge of the consumer. Consumers are usually
178
179
180
181
182

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. ß 7 (1997).
Dobbs, supra note 38, ß 357, at 985.
Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 674 (Ga. 1994).
Pelman v. McDonaldís Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id. at 540.
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provided with a range of sizes, and they will make the choice to
continue eating or not.183 For these reasons it seems unlikely
that allegations based in a strict liability duty to warn will be
successful.
6. Negligence
Finally, plaintiffs may argue that the fast-food industry is
negligent. Negligence is ìunreasonable conduct, as measured
against the conduct of a reasonable prudent manufacturer in the
same or similar circumstances.î184 Modern courts hold food
manufacturers to a duty of reasonable care for manufacturing
and design defects.185 However, in the obesity context, plaintiffs
may find it difficult to identify the duty manufacturers have to
consumers to make healthier products. In cases involving gun
manufacturers, courts used a multiple-factor balancing test to
determine whether the defendant owed a duty to consumers
injured by their products.186 These factors were enumerated in
Rowland v. Christian and are: the foreseeability of the plaintiffsí
harm, the certainty of the plaintiffsí injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendantís actions and the plaintiffsí
injury, the culpability of the defendantís conduct, the desirability
of preventing future harm, and the burdens and benefits of
imposing such a duty.187 It is interesting to note that the Pelman
decision held that no duty existed without resorting to these
factors because it determined that over-consumption was out of
the control of the manufacturer.188 However, an analysis of the
factors is instructive.
For example, the foreseeability of harm to an individual
plaintiff is attenuated. All people eat, but not all become fat.
Only a certain proportion of the population is susceptible to
obesity.189 The closeness of the connection between fast-food
restaurants and obesity for a majority of its customers is limited
by the frequency of their visits to fast-food restaurants. Also,
183 Some research has shown that non-obese children will stop their total percentage
of calorie input at lower levels than obese children when provided with larger portion
sizes. Obese people continue to eat. This research suggests that the size of the portions
does not cause obesity; what the obese children lack is control. Pediatric Obesity; Fast
Food is Lure to Overweight Children, OBESITY, FITNESS & WELLNESS, Nov. 8, 2003, at 30.
184 Owen, supra note 41, at 861.
185 Id. at 889.
186 Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for the Sale of Non-defective Products: An
Analysis and Critique of the Concept of Negligent Marketing, 53 S.C. L. REV. 907, 952-54
(2002).
187 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).
188 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
189 James O. Hill, An Overview of the Etiology of Obesity, in EATING DISORDERS AND
OBESITY, A COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK 460, 463 (Christopher G. Fairburn & Kelley D.
Brownell eds., 2002).
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unless fast-food restaurants deceive consumers, feeding hungry
people is not a culpable act. Furthermore, although there are
certainly many desirable benefits to preventing unhealthy eating
habits, placing the burden of improving the nationís eating habits
on the fast-food industry by making them liable for obesity would
not necessarily accomplish that aim. Most likely, the fast-food
industry would react by either providing warnings or by
providing healthier alternatives. In that case, the public would
most likely just turn to the abundance of unhealthy alternatives
in the grocery stores or disregard the warnings and continue
their unhealthy diets. Such a reaction is likely, however, when
one observes that the addition of nutritional information on food
products has hardly seemed to change peopleís eating habits.
Thus, these factors do not clearly indicate that the burden in
creating a duty and imposing liability on the fast-food industry
would necessarily benefit society.
Even if plaintiffs established a duty, to prove negligence the
plaintiffs must also prove that the fast-food industry breached
that duty and that that breach caused the plaintiffsí damages.190
In Pelman, the court found that the plaintiffs could not establish
A further analysis of
a prima-facie case for causation.191
causation in the obesity context will be continued below.
However, unless the plaintiffs can establish this causation,
negligence will likely fail.
B.

Barriers to Fast-food Liability

To find fast-food corporations liable for their contribution to
the nationís obesity, plaintiffs must overcome three significant
obstacles under any theory of product liability. They must prove
that: the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous as
sold; the defendant had a duty to prevent the danger from the
product even when the plaintiff was aware of its harmful
properties; and the product caused them injury.
To put it simply, eating high fat, carbohydrate rich fast foods
can be extraordinarily unhealthy and dangerous. Does that
make this food defective? The Restatement (Third) of Torts
suggests that courts consider a ìharm-causing ingredient of the
food product . . . a defect if a reasonable consumer would not
expect the food product to contain that ingredient.î192 Under this
standard, fast foods are not defective because the public
generally expects them to be high fat and carbohydrate rich.
190
191
192

Dobbs, supra note 38, ß 114, at 269.
See supra notes 98-117 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. ß 7 (1997).
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This barrier, however, can be overcome if courts adopt a riskbenefit test. Fast foods generally fail this test because these
foods have significant negative health effects and are of suspect
nutritional value. Unfortunately, the difficulty with the riskbenefit test is in articulating a universal standard to measure the
nutritional benefits of specific food products against their
negative health effects.
Given the constantly changing
information as to appropriate nutritional choices, it is doubtful
that such a standard would be accepted by the public.193
It is even more difficult to establish that the fast-food
industry has a duty to its customers when there is an extensive
legal history suggesting that plaintiffs are personally responsible
for the harm caused by products they purchase with knowledge
of their dangerous qualities. The Restatement (Second) of Torts,
the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability section, and
an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have indicated that
plaintiffs must take responsibility for their actions. As noted in
Pelman, the Restatement (Second) of Torts exempted the food
industry from taking responsibility for over-consumption of
food.194 The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,
comment j also adopts the position of section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts on over-consumption.195 Finally,
an overwhelming number of jurisdictions have held that there is
no duty to warn consumers of obvious risks.196
The most difficult barrier to ascribing liability to the fastfood industry is causation. Plainly, obesity is caused by many
factors. For example, one study identified the following short
lists of factors that cause weight gain with aging: a decline in
resting metabolic rate; a decline in physical activity; an increase
in food intake; high fat diets; family, social, and cultural
attitudes toward weight; and genetic factors.197 Furthermore, Dr.
Brownell, Yale psychology professor and director of the Yale
Center for Eating and Weight Disorders, also blamed the rise in
obesity on a toxic environment for physical exercise.198 Any
successful claim against the fast-food industry must provide a
See e.g. NESTLE, supra note 22, at 67-110.
See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. ß 2 cmt. j (ìIn general, a
product seller is not subject to liability for failing to warn or instruct regarding risks and
risk-avoidance measures that should be obvious to, or generally known by, foreseeable
product users.î).
196 When the Products Liability restatement was issued in 1997, an ìoverwhelming
majority of jurisdictionsî supported the rule that there was no duty to warn of obvious
and generally known dangers. Id. Annotations of the restatement do not reflect a
significant shift from that position.
197 Grundy, supra note 155, at 566S-67S.
198 Brownell, supra note 17, at 436-37.
193
194
195
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causation theory to overcome these other factors in order to show
that the fast-food industry is the sole or primary cause of the
plaintiffís obesity.
As in the gun manufacturing context, courts would have to
allow plaintiffs to use easier tests for causation to prove their
case in order for cases against the fast-food industry to be
successful.199 The usual test for causation is the ìbut forî or ìsine
qua nonî test that requires plaintiffs prove that they would not
be injured if the defendantís act had not occurred.200 In the
obesity cases based on negligent marketing, the plaintiff would
have to comply with this test by showing that the defendantís
advertising induced their consumption and the consumption
caused their obesity.201 In Pelman, this was an insurmountable
barrier.202 In some states a solution to this obstacle may be the
use of a ìsubstantial factorî test.203 This theory is used when two
factors join and either could have independently caused an
injury.204 Because the decision whether a cause is substantial is
given to the jury, this theory could potentially allow plaintiffs to
establish causation if the fast-food industry became unpopular.205
However, the burden to prove that the fast-food industry caused
obesity would be on the plaintiffs, and it still would not relieve
the plaintiffs from detailing how the other factors interacted with
the fast-food industry actions to cause obesity.
Even if plaintiffs were able to establish that fast foods
caused their obesity, they would have the additional problem of
establishing which restaurants were specifically responsible.
Again, in the case of gun manufacturing, some courts allowed
plaintiffs to solve this problem by using enterprise or market
share liability.206 In the fast foods context, the use of either of
these theories will have important implications and specific
difficulties in application.
Enterprise liability imposes ìstrict liability [on] business
enterprises for harms perceived to be recurrently associated with
their operation.î207 This would allow plaintiffs to sue a trade
association ìon the theory that promulgating standards, or some
other action by the association, contributed to his injuries.î208
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208

See Ausness, supra note 186, at 946.
Dobbs, supra note 38, ß 168, at 409.
See Ausness, supra note 186, at 946-47.
See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
Ausness, supra note 186, at 947.
Id.
See id. at 948.
Id. at 948-49.
Dobbs, supra note 38, at 908.
Ausness, supra note 186, at 948.
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The rationale behind this theory is that the members of the
industry ìcooperate[d], tacitly or expressly, in particular
conduct . . . [and] are said to be acting in concert. Each of those
acting in concert is liable jointly and severally for all the
intended or foreseeable resulting harm.î209 In the fast food
context, this theory would be justified either if members of the
industry had worked together, intentionally or unintentionally,
to deceive consumers210 or if juries accepted the argument that
the costs of obesity could be passed on by the industry through
insurance and higher prices.211
Market-share liability is a theory created to assign
responsibility when there is delay in the onset of damages and
when it is difficult to identify the original manufacturer of a
product. It ìenables plaintiffs to recover from each member of an
entire industry based on its market share of the products sold.î212
This theory reached notoriety in diethylstilbesterol ìDESî cases,
in which the plaintiffs faced the insurmountable barrier of
finding which manufacturer among 300 provided their parents a
fungible drug that caused their birth defects.213 There are some
parallels and differences between DES and fast-food liability.
Like DES, food is a fungible product, but unlike DES, it is not
difficult to establish where plaintiffs ate when there is a pattern
of consumer choices. In this respect, liability for the fast-food
industry is more analogous to liability in gun manufacturing. In
Hamilton v. Beretta,214 a main case on gun manufacturer
liability, the New York Court of Appeals decided that market
share was inappropriate because it was possible to identify the
manufacturer and because different guns had different levels of
risk.215 Fast food plaintiffs may face the same obstacle because
different foods have different inherent risks based on their
preparation and because it is much easier to identify where the
plaintiffs have eaten.
An additional obstacle to the use of these causation theories
may be other industries that contribute to obesity. The decline in
physical exercise due to an increase in the popularity of
sedentary activities is a ìsubstantial factorî causing obesity that
Dobbs, supra note 38, at 936.
See Hall v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(holding a whole industry liable because they jointly controlled the risk created by
inadequate standards for dynamite caps).
211 Dobbs, supra note 38, ß 353, at 975. See also, Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of
Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1266 (1997).
212 Ausness, supra note 186, at 949.
213 Frank J. Giliberti, Emerging Trends for Products Liability: Market Share
Liability, Its History and Future, 15 TOURO L. REV. 719, 723-25 (1999).
214 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001).
215 Id. at 1066-67; Ausness, supra note 186, at 949.
209
210
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makes these theories less workable. If, as Dr. Kelley Brownell
notes, ì[t]he computer, television, and video games have made
sedentary behavior very appealing and engaging, especially for
children,î these industries should also be included in the formula
that assigns responsibility for obesity.216 Ultimately, the share of
responsibility becomes excessively large and unworkable.
C. Surmounting Barriers to Fast-food Liability; Negligent
Marketing and Advertising
Some courts may not find these barriers to fast-food liability
insurmountable. They may apply the theories developed to hold
gun manufacturers liable for how they marketed and promoted
guns.
In that context, plaintiffs have alleged that the
manufacturerís ìmarketing practices . . . affirmatively created a
risk of harm to others.î217 In a series of cases, courts found that
gun manufacturersí ìspecial ability to detect and to guard against
the risks associated with [their] products gave rise to a
ëprotective relationshipí with those who might be injured.î218
This was especially true when there was a relationship ìbetween
a defendant and a third party, such as a parent and child,î and
when the ìdefendant affirmatively enhanced an inherent risk.î219
Furthermore, the duty arose because the risk from the
defendantís conduct was foreseeable and therefore, the
defendantís conduct was ìmorally blameworthy.î220
Fast-food liability fits neatly into this theory, generally
called negligent marketing or advertising. Under this theory,
plaintiffs would claim that the risk of childhood obesity is
affirmatively enhanced by the marketing and advertising
campaigns of the fast-food industry. Additionally, plaintiffs
would claim that fast-food companies target children and induce
them to eat dangerous foods. This conduct is foreseeable and
intentionally increases the risk children will become obese.
However, cases espousing this theory have been overturned
This led one
by higher courts in the past few years.221
commentator to cast doubt as to the future viability of this
theory.222 Nonetheless, the theory has recently risen from ashes
Brownell, supra note 17, at 437.
Ausness, supra note 186, at 952.
Id. at 925 (discussing the following case using this theory: Hamilton v. Accu-Tek,
62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1999) revíd, 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
219 Ausness, supra note 186, at 925-26, 932.
220 Id. at 932-33.
221 See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001); Merrill v.
Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
222 Ausness, supra note 186, at 965. ìHowever, two cases decided last year, Hamilton
216
217
218
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in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Ileto v. Glock, a Ninth
Circuit panel based liability on a claim that a gun manufacturerís
ìaffirmative actions in distributing their products [created] an
illegal secondary market for guns that targets illegal
purchasers.î223 The Ileto court did not characterize the issue as
one of product liability.224 Instead, the court held that the
defendantís possible negligence in allowing its products to
produce a nuisance could survive the defendantís Rule 12(b)(6)
motion. This case rests on an interpretation of California
nuisance law that suggests that certain occupations can become a
nuisance ìwhen . . . business is performed in a manner that
This allows
unreasonably infringes on a public right.î225
plaintiffs to avoid the difficult proof issues for defectiveness in
product liability by focusing solely on the effect of negligent
marketing on the ability of the product to create a nuisance.
Under this reasoning in Ileto, fast-food liability becomes more
viable.
By approaching the issue from the angle of negligent
marketing, the Ileto court was able to find a duty on the part of
the defendants and breach of that duty. The court found a duty
because Glock purposefully targeted and oversupplied states
with less restrictive gun laws, increasing the probability that
their guns would fall into the hands of illegal purchasers.226 An
analogy to the fast-food industryís excessive targeting of children
may be just as persuasive. It is just as foreseeable that, by
targeting children, the fast-food industry has affirmatively
increased the risk of obesity. Furthermore, in Ileto, the court
found a breach of duty because ì[t]he social value of
manufacturing and distributing guns without taking basic steps
to prevent these guns from reaching illegal purchasers and
possessors cannot outweigh the public interest in keeping guns
out of the hands of illegal purchasers and possessors who in turn
use them in crimes.î227 It is but a short step to make the
argument that the social value of selling high fat, carbohydrate
rich foods without taking the basic steps to inform parents of the
unhealthy characteristics of this food cannot outweigh the public
interest from keeping dangerously unhealthy food from
vulnerable children.
Only time will tell if the Ileto decision will stand or if its
v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. and Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., cast serious doubt about the future of
negligent marketing as a viable legal theory.î Id. (internal citations omitted).
223 349 F.3d 1191, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003).
224 Id. at 1201-02.
225 Id. at 1214.
226 Id. at 1204-05.
227 Id. at 1205.
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reasoning will ever be extended to claims against the fast-food
industry. Ileto relies on a substantial factor test to prove
causation, and its extension of nuisance beyond real property was
controversial in California.228 As noted earlier, the substantial
factor test raises its own difficulties in the fast food context.
Furthermore, the Ileto dissent took issue with the majorityís
characterizations that it was not a product liability action and
that nuisance created by a product could be extended in
California beyond real property.229 It is difficult to predict
whether this extension of nuisance law will be beneficial to fastfood litigation plaintiffs.230 In spite of these difficulties, it is
possible that some courts may find the fast-food industry liable
for causing obesity by using the reasoning of Ileto and other
lawsuits against gun manufacturers.231
V.
A.

PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR OBESITY LIABILITY

The Root of the Public Policy Debate

The McDonaldís litigation was about choices made by
plaintiffs in response to an environment in which they were
encouraged to consume fast foods by major corporations. The
reason plaintiffs seek to find these corporations liable is
obviousóthe fast-food industry has a powerful role in controlling
what we eat. According to the United States Department of
Agriculture, in 2000 the nationís 844,000 food service eating
establishments sold over $358 billion worth of meals and
snacks.232 Fast-food sales accounted for $125 billion of these
sales.233 Food service sales are projected to account for 49% of
total food sales by the year 2010.234 The fast-food industry
Id. at 1206, 1213-14.
Id. at 1220, 1223-24 (Hall, J. dissenting). ìBut to assert that this action is not
about products borders on the absurd. . . . The nature of appelleesí conduct cannot be
analyzed apart from the product they are selling.î Id. at 1220.
230 Presently, there is a substantial split of authority nationally over whether a public
nuisance theory should be allowed in the gun context. See City of Gary ex rel. King v.
Smith & Wesson, Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1232 & n.8 (Ind. 2003) (citing recent decisions
either dismissing or allowing public nuisance action to proceed against gun
manufacturers). Therefore, it is even more difficult to predict whether the courts would
find such a theory persuasive for claims based on obesity.
231 City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E. 2d 1136, 1143 (Ohio 2002)
(holding gun manufacturer can be ìheld liable for creating [a] nuisance.î); White v. Smith
& Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 828-29 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (finding a duty of care for gun
manufacturers to children and other unauthorized users of handguns as well as
municipalities who suffer both physical and economic injury through unauthorized gun
use).
232 Charlene Price, Food Service, in ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEPíT AGRIC., THE
U.S. FOOD MARKETING SYSTEM, 2002, at 34, http:\\www.ers.usda.gov.
233 Id. at 35.
234 Id. at 34.
228
229
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heavily advertises to maintain its proportion of the food dollar.235
For example, McDonaldís is the largest fast-food advertiser at
$1.3 billion in 2002, ranking 15th among the top 100 national
advertisers.236 Therefore, plaintiffs could have a significant
impact on the nationís health if they are successful in changing
the practices of these corporations.
The power of the food industry to influence eating behaviors
especially impacts childrenís health.
One recent report
commissioned by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation
summarized many of the current studies on the role of the media
in influencing childhood obesity. Based on these studies, it
concluded that:
[I]t appears likely that the main mechanism by which media
use contributes to childhood obesity may well be through
childrenís exposure to billions of dollars of food advertising and
cross-promotional marketing year after year, starting at the
very youngest ages, with childrenís favorite media characters
often enlisted in the sales pitch. Research indicates childrenís
food choicesóand parentsí food purchasesóare significantly
impacted by the advertising they see. The number of ads
children see on TV has doubled from 20,000 to 40,000 since the
1970s, and the majority of ads targeted to kids are for candy,
cereal, and fast food.237

From this perspective, the importance of the public policy debate
becomes clearer. In our society, children are born into this
obesity-conducive environment encouraged by these powerful
corporations. However, it does not necessarily follow that these
corporations should be held liable for the resulting obesity and its
effects. Aside from the fact that eating is an individual act of free
choice, Congressís attempt to create a federal exemption for fastfood liability has both positive and negative consequences to the
fast-food industry and to our ability to address the causes of
obesity.
B.

The Rationale for an Exemption for Fast-food Liability

Many commentators have criticized the American legal
system for allowing plaintiffs to bring ìfrivolousî suits against
the fast-food industry, arguing that consumers should be
The Personal
personally responsible for their actions.238
Id. at 79 app. tbl. 30. In 1999, restaurant advertising was 3.4 million.
R. Craig Endicott, 100 Leading National Advertisers, 74 ADVERTISING AGE, June
23, 2003, at S-1.
237 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN CHILDHOOD
OBESITY 10 (2004), http://www.kff.org/entmedia/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/
getfile.cfm&PageID=32022.
238 See CTR. LEGAL POLICY MANHATTAN INST., TRIAL LAWYERS INC.: A REPORT ON THE
235
236
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Responsibility in Food Consumption Act would prevent plaintiffs
from holding the fast-food industry liable for obesity.239 The
National Restaurant Association has asked Congress to recognize
that consumers should be personally responsible for their
actions.240 This is the industryís strongest argument against
these lawsuits. One reporter summarized the argument as:
ì[y]ouíre fat, your fault. . . . [P]eople can make their own choices
about food and exercise.î241 Therefore, one of the negative
consequences to fast-food liability, so the argument runs, is the
policy implication of not holding people personally responsible for
the harms caused by the exercise of their own free will.
Another consequence of extending liability would be the
damage to the public perception of the judicial system. If
plaintiffs were to be successful, undoubtedly there would be a
strong public reaction to the outcome of the suit.242 It would be
cited as another example of judicial activism that interferes with
the proper role of the legislature. It would be criticized as a
blatant misuse of judicial resources. Ultimately, it could lead to
damaging public skepticism of the justice of our legal system.
Of course, there are also economic consequences to imposing
liability on the fast-food industry. The restaurant industry could
suffer from decreased sales from negative publicity, increased
insurance costs arising from the exposure to liability and the
burden of litigation expenses.243 And, the fast-food industry is
LAWSUIT INDUSTRY IN AMERICA 2003, at 18-19, at http:\\www.triallawyers.com
239 Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 339, 108th Cong. (2003).
240 ìNot only do the lawsuits we are discussing this morning fail to acknowledge the
voluntary nature of the choices customers make, they also do not address the
fundamental issue of personal responsibility.î
Personal Responsibility in Food
Consumption Act: Hearing on H.R. 339 Before Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 35 (2003) [hereinafter Personal
Responsibility Hearing] (statement of Christianne Ricchi, on behalf of the National
Restaurant Association), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/87814.PDF.
241 Siobhan McDonough, Weighty Issues: Americansí Flab Spurs War Along Political
Lines, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 23, 2003, at A3.
242 According to a 2003 Gallup Poll:
[N]early 9 in 10 Americans (89%) oppose holding the fast-food industry legally responsible
for the diet-related health problems of people who eat that kind of food on a regular basis.
Just 9% are in favor. Those who describe themselves as overweight are no more likely
than others to blame the fast-food industry for obesity-related health problems, or to favor
lawsuits against the industry.
Lydia Saad, Public Balks at Obesity Lawsuits, GALLUP POLL: TUESDAY BRIEFING, July 21,
2003, at 109, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr030721.asp.
243 INS. INFO. INST., OBESITY, LIABILITY & INSURANCE (arguing that the insurance
industry should take the threat of liability seriously). ìGiven the increasing cost and even
scarcity of certain types of liability coverage, the recent obesity-related litigation against
the fast-food industry is of special concern.î Id. at 16. Personal Responsibility Hearing,
supra note 240, at 34-35 (arguing that liability for obesity could damage small businesses
including her own). See also Meg Green, Food Fright, BESTíS REV., Aug. 2003, at 24
(discussing the repercussions for insurers caused by recent fast-food lawsuits).
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certainly not the only one that could be held liable for obesity.
The costs of future litigation and liability in industries across the
board could potentially explode having a detrimental impact on
the national economy.244 Although large corporations such as
McDonaldís may have the resources to absorb these additional
costs and the capacity to defend themselves, smaller companies
would be less able to sustain these costs and more vulnerable to
such lawsuits.245
C.

The Rationale Against an Exemption for Fast-food Liability

Health commentators nationally and internationally have
demonstrated that advertising by the food industry, and
specifically the fast-food industry, has influenced the foods that
children eat.246 By taking away the threat of liability for their
actions, Congress would be implicitly supporting the actions of
these corporations. There should be a point where company
action in search of sales and profitability at the expense of the
public health becomes culpable. This culpability will be forever
evaded if liability against these companies is foreclosed.
Congress should not interfere with the stateís prerogative in
exploring this culpability. The control of state courts is the
province of the states, and federalism and comity suggest that
states should be allowed to control their own product liability
law. Recent experience shows that some individual states are

244 The ice cream industry has also been notified it is a potential target! Marguerite
Higgins, Lawyers Scream About Ice Cream, WASH. TIMES, JULY 25, 2003, at A1. One
study identified the following industries that could be targeted: agriculture, food
processors & manufacturers, beverage makers, food distributors, grocers, restaurants &
franchises, advertising agencies, TV networks/magazines/newspapers, toy manufacturers,
and sporting/entertainment organizers. INS. INFO. INST., supra note 243, at 16. There
have been many articles and studies written as to the negative effect of litigation on the
economy. E.g. DAVID DIAL ET AL., TORT EXCESS: THE NECESSITY FOR REFORM FROM A
POLICY, LEGAL AND RISK MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 8 (2003) (discussing the economic
impact of tort abuse on the states and national economies), available at
http://server.iii.org/ yy_obj_data/binary/727182_1_0/tortreform.pdf.
245 See Personal Responsibility Hearing, supra note 240, at 34.
246 Shawna L. Mercer, et al., Possible Lessons from the Tobacco Experience for Obesity
Control, AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1073S, 1075S (2003)
Television appears to be directly and causally related to the prevalence of obesity among
children . . . . Televised food advertisements have a major influence on the dietary intake
of children. . . . [A] recent study found that food products account for more than 60% of the
products advertised on Saturday morning television programs for children.
Id. (internal citations omitted). Andrew Oliver, Note, The Proposed European Union Ban
on Television Advertising Targeting Children: Would it Violate European Human Rights
Law?, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INTíL & COMP. L. 501 (2000). ìSwedish law bans all television
advertising that specifically targets children under the age of twelve. This prohibition . . .
affects not only toy advertisements, but covers advertising for sweets and fast foods as
well.î Id. at 501. Sweden attempted to extend this ban to all of Europe to protect
children from the effects of such advertising. Id.
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moving toward restricting liability,247 and there is a real value in
allowing the states to be a ìlaboratory of experimentationî248 to
find the best solution to deal with the public policy issues
presented by obesity. In the same vein, respect for the appellate
process suggests that there is no need for the federal government
to step in. The appellate process worked to overturn lawsuits
brought against the gun industry,249 and therefore, it is probably
even more likely that the appellate process would be quicker to
overturn suits for obesity. Without at least some evidence the
states cannot handle the issues arising from obesity liability,
Congress should allow the states to make their own individual
decisions.
By foreclosing liability, Congress would also prevent other
important functions of product liability litigation. Our product
liability system ìbrings into public view decisions balancing the
utility and the hazards of the products we use and depend on,
[and] it allows the people to pass judgment on those decisions.î250
It also influences the behavior of corporate executives who make
decisions whether to market an unreasonably dangerous product
or risk the discovery process and exposure to the media.251
Congress would also take away the incentive product liability
provides the fast-food industry to display warnings and
nutritional information and promote healthier alternatives.252
Of course, the food industry could take voluntary actions to
curb its ìobesity-encouraging practicesî without an exemption

247 Louisiana has already passed legislation preventing liability for obesity and
ì[n]ineteen other state legislaturesóArizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin ñ were
consideraing similar bills as of March 1,î according to the National Conference of State
Legislatures. CBSNEWS.com, House Passes ëCheeseburger Billí, at http://www.cbsnews
.com/stories/2004/03/10/health/printable605157.shtml (March 10, 2004).
See also,
National Conference of State Legislatures, Excerpt from Issue Brief on Nutrition and
Obesity, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/IBIntro.htm (Apr. 1, 2002) (detailing
current state legislation dealing with obesity).
248 In the context of gun control, Justice Kennedy emphasized these values. ìIn this
circumstance, the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States may
perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where
the best solution is far from clear.î United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
249 See e.g. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001); Merrill v.
Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
250 Bogus, supra note 31, at 219.
251 Id.
252 See Timothy D. Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for CrimeRelated Injuries: Defining a Suitable Role for the Tort System in Regulating the Firearms
Industry, 65 MO. L. REV. 1, 51-52, 62, (discussing how the tort system has provided
incentives for safety in the firearms and auto industries as a ì[c]omplement to [l]egislative
and [a]dministrative [r]egulation.î).
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from liability.253 However, if it did not change these practices
and Congress prevented liability, the fast-food industry would no
longer be exposed to both litigation and regulation. The threat of
litigation (and its subsequent effect on stock prices) is one of the
most powerful tools available to change corporationsí behavior.254
As noted by Professor Cass Sunstein, ìlawsuits are a form of
regulation,î but they make up ìfor a shortfall of regulation by
Without the threat of litigation,
government agencies.î255
Congress will find itself facing the pressure for resolving these
problems, and any shortfall in the regulation of these industries
would likely be remedied by either federal legislation or
regulation.
Undoubtedly, the fast-food industryís exposure to product
liability has costs,256 but at this time those costs are not
significant as compared to potential costs of future regulation or
legislation. As addressed earlier, no present cause of action
adequately supports liability, so an actual liability cost does not
But what of the argument that small
presently exist.257
restaurants will be forced out of business if liability is extended?
Even if liability were imposed, it is unlikely that the costs
shouldered by the small restaurants would be significant. The
small businesses will likely not be the first targets. It is more
likely that the $125 billion-strong fast-food industry, dominated
by large corporations (who, as shown in Pelman, are well-able to
defend themselves) would be the first target. The cost equation
must also be evaluated by taking into account the effect
regulation may have on the corporate bottom-line. Liability costs
are felt after a corporation has committed misdeeds. This allows
the market to control costs by allowing the fast-food corporations
to choose their level of self-regulation.258 If liability is foreclosed,
the only governmental control of these corporationsí obesitypromoting behavior will be through government regulation or
taxation. In the past few years, public health commentators
have been calling for taxation of fast foods and for increased

41.

253
254

Ben Kelley, Fair Warning for Fat Peddlers, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2003, at A27.
Samuel Loewenberg, Are Lawyers the New Regulators?, 2003 NATíL J. 2640, 2640-

Id. at 2641 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Bogus, supra note 31, at 218.
Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 339 (Feb. 10, 2004) at
ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/50xx/doc5037/hr339.pdf.
258 Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products
Liability, 60 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 82 (1995) (arguing that the ìproducts liability system
compensates for the shortcomings of administrative regulationî and ì[i]t stimulates selfregulation, giving manufacturers a strong incentive to learn as much as possible about
potential hazards and reduce risk.î). See Lytton, supra note 252, at 52 (concluding that
the ìthreat of tort liability provides incentives for the [gun manufacturing] industry to
police itselfî).
255
256
257
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regulation.259 The Food and Drug Administration has responded
and recently unveiled its strategy to reduce obesity by strongly
encouraging restaurants to begin including nutrient information
in menus.260 Such encouragement could turn into regulation or
taxation without the external controls of restaurant behavior
from product liability. In order to avoid potentially crippling
federal regulations, the fast-food restaurants themselves should
welcome the opportunity to state their case in the courts.
Finally, in the aggregate, the costs do not outweigh the
benefits provided by our product liability system as demonstrated
by fast-food corporationsí response to threatened litigation. The
relatively few unsuccessful cases and their media exposure have
brought beneficial changes to the way the fast-food industry does
business.
The fast-food companies have responded to the
incentives to self-regulate and have reduced their exposure to
litigation. The fast-food companies are now competing to show
they can provide healthier alternatives and nutritional advice.261
The success of companies demonstrating a commitment to
supplying healthier alternatives and providing nutritional advice
Even
has spurred these changes across the industry.262
McDonaldís is changing its behavior and benefiting from that
change. In October 2003, McDonaldís named a director of
worldwide nutrition and then in January 2004, launched an
initiative called ìReal Life Choicesî in New York to provide
nutritional education programs.263 In April 2004, McDonaldís
259 KELLY D. BROWNELL & KATHERINE BATTLE HORGEN, FOOD FIGHT 217-35 (2004)
(arguing that a good approach toward eliminating obesity would be to ìsubsidize all fruits
and vegetables with revenue generated by a tax on soft drinks, snack foods, and fast
foodsî and by making obesity a ìpriority in the four main [federal] food programsî).
260 Press Release, United States Department of Health & Human Services, HHS
Unveils FDA Strategy to Help Reduce Obesity (March 12, 2004). ìEncouraging the
restaurant industry to launch a national, voluntary effort to include nutritional
information for consumers at the point of sale.î Id.
261 Elizabeth Lee, Fast Food Goes on a Diet, ATLANTA J. CONST., Sept. 19, 2003, at A1.
Consider whatís happened in just the past week. McDonaldís announced it was teaming
up with Bob Greene to promote a Go Active meal for adults, with a salad, a pedometer to
count steps and a bottle of water . . . Wendyís revamped the nutrition section of its Web
site to provide more information on meal choices, including recommendations for people
who are dieting . . . Burger King unveiled its grilled sandwiches with 5 grams of fat, and a
light combo meal made up of one of those sandwiches, bottle water and a salad.
Id. Nancy Dillon, McDís Goes Healthy in NY: But Nutritionists Query Programís Real
Impact, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 7, 2003, available at, 2003 WL 65395464 (describing how
McDonaldís, Blimpie, and Burger King provide new products or nutritional advice on how
to lower calories while eating at their restaurants).
262 Lee, supra note 261. Fast-food companies are changing their behavior because of
the ìsuccess of chains that have heavily promoted healthier choices, such as Subway and
Wendyís.î Id.
263 Press Release, McDonaldís Corp., McDonaldís Corporation Announces Worldwide
Nutrition Director (Oct. 8, 2003), available at http://164.109.33.187/content/corp/news/
corppr/cpr10082003.html; Press Release, McDonaldís Corp., McDonaldís Real Life Choices
Teaches Consumers How to Eat the McDonaldís Food They Love and Stay on Track with
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came out with a national campaign to provide ìAdult Happy
Mealsî with salads, pedometers, and health advice for its
customers.264 Perhaps the most striking change, however, is
McDonaldís recent decision to stop ìsuper-sizingî its meals.265
This change appears to be in direct response to potential liability
problems and shows the potential deterrent effect of the threat of
litigation.266 Furthermore, McDonaldís new menus, offering
salad as a healthier alternative, has driven the company to even
higher profits.267
VI. CONCLUSION
As product liability law presently stands, the fast-food
industry will most likely not be held liable for influencing the
publicís eating behavior. The existing theories of product liability
do not appear to support such an action. Pelman demonstrates
the difficulty courts have in assigning responsibility to the fastfood industry when plaintiffs have made choices with obvious
risks. Pelman also presents the difficulty plaintiffs will have in
establishing that fast food is a defective product, in creating a
duty toward the plaintiff, and in finding that fast food caused
their injuries. In the near future, these obstacles may be
insurmountable.
Yet one is left with the unsettling feeling that obesity is not
strictly a personal choice. It is undisputed that the food industry
markets to children to influence both their behavior and, through
them, their parentsí behavior. Children are incapable of making
these choices, and it is questionable that parents should shoulder
all the blame for these actions when there are such powerful
forces working against them. Whether the fast-food industry has
Their Diets (Jan. 6, 2004), available at http://164.109.33.187/usa/news/current/conpr_
01062004.html.
264 Dave Carpenter, McDonaldís Rolls Out Adult Happy Meals, ORANGE COUNTY
REG., Apr. 16, 2004, at B1.
265 Press Release, McDonaldís Corp., McDonaldís Media Response to Core Menu and
Super Sizing (Mar. 2, 2004), available at http://164.109.33.187/usa/news/current/conpr_
030120040.html.
266 Albeit McDonaldís has implied it is only a business decision based entirely on
sales! Press Release, McDonaldís Corp., McDonaldís Sales Momentum Continues; Reports
Record February Sales, Up 23% (Mar. 5, 2004), available at http://www.mcdonalds.com/
corp/news/fnpr/fpr_03052004.RowPar.0001.ContentPar.0001.ColumnPar.0006.File.tmp/M
CD%20Sales%20Update%20February%202004.pdf.
267 See McDonaldís Healthier Menu Brings Back Profits, DAILY EXPRESS, Oct. 24,
2003 (describing the effect McDonaldís healthier menus have had on profits in the United
States), available at 2003 WL 65920716.
See Press Release, McDonaldís Corp.,
McDonaldís Sales Momentum Continues; Reports Record February Sales, Up 23% (Mar.
5, 2004) (indicating that one of the drivers of its tenth consecutive month of improved
sales was enhanced menu variety), available at http://www.mcdonalds.com/corp/news/
fnpr/fpr_03052004.RowPar.0001.ContentPar.0001.ColumnPar.0006.File.tmp/MCD%20Sal
es%20Update%20February%202004.pdf.
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created a public nuisance by promoting unhealthy products and
whether courts should ever interfere in this area of personal
choice are difficult questions. Ultimately, these issues are not
completely answered by existing theories. Thus, it is wise to
allow the federal government, state legislatures and state courts
to grapple with these issues without a foreclosure of product
liability for obesity. History has shown that the laws of product
liability have adapted to hold manufacturers responsible for
culpable conduct. Fast-food litigation should stand or fall
depending on whether the public finds the industryís conduct
culpable through both the litigation and the regulation process.
The current pervasive presence of obesity in the United States
suggests that this problem will not be reduced nor eliminated
soon without continued attention to these issues.

